Notes to myself: I started drafting this blog one day before the Biden Inauguration and was not expecting to be this long. An initially short blog questioning the base and evidences of genocide against China in Xinjiang has been turned into a full blown desktop research project and the blog becomes one of the longest. It has been snow balling as one thing or one thought leads to another, pushing me to gather more data and read more reports along the way. In the end I feel happy that I did it as the complexity of the issue deserves this much attention. It also gets me up early in the morning to try to finish it the earliest. Some thoughts toward the end of this blog (not this Part I) have been in my head for a while and this genocide case is a good time to let those old thoughts out. I will break the blog into parts to make it more manageable to edit.
International challenges generally can wait until after the pandemic and the domestic economy have been taken care of. Of course, we can immediately right the obvious wrongs, such as returning to the Paris treaty and rejoining the WHO, as Biden has done on his first day in the office.
But we all know the biggest international policy challenge — immediately and for the long term, for this administration and also for the entire world for that matter — remains to be a country with a five lettered name: “China.”
I really hoped the new Biden administration to bring a new China approach different from that of the Trump administration, and the genocide charge against Beijing would be the perfect place to begin.
Genocide in Xinjiang: The Background
According to this NYT report, It all started with the former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who had a rushed conclusion that what China has been doing in Xinjiang fitted the definition of genocide. “I believe this genocide is ongoing, and that we are witnessing the systematic attempt to destroy Uighurs by the Chinese party-state,” Pompeo said in a statement, adding that Chinese officials were “engaged in the forced assimilation and eventual erasure of a vulnerable ethnic and religious minority group.”
The same NYT report also told us that “Genocide is, according to international convention, “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”
The declaration is not without debates. “Mr. Pompeo, State Department lawyers and other officials had debated for months over the determination, but the matter had gained urgency in the Trump administration’s final days.” Eventually Pompeo prevailed: “Mr. Pompeo and other national security aides advocated tough measures against Beijing, while President Trump and top economic advisers brushed aside the concerns.”
Clearly and unsurprisingly, we have a bipartisan agreement when it comes to China. In the Senate confirmation hearing, Antony Blinken agreed with the genocide claim, and pledged to be tough on China. Perhaps Blinken was just trying to impress the Senate GOP majority before the inauguration? Not so, as Blinken denounced the Xinjiang “concentration camps” and asserted that China “poses the most significant challenge of any nation-state to the United States.” The Biden campaign statement had made the same accusation.
The Key Evidences
I believe the genocide charge was a rushed call not just because it came days before Pompeo left the office, which was suspicious as Kurt Campbell has pointed out. But most importantly it is because the evidences are weak, essentially from one report by Adrian Zenz, a German researcher focusing on China and Xinjiang.
To begin, I must first admit that I paid little attention to the Xinjiang issue before, as I felt impossible to have access to real facts and truth to talk intelligently on the topic. What changed me was this NYT report right before the Biden inauguration. It outlined the short history that led to the latest US declaration of genocide. Even better, it contained a link to another NYT report that I was not aware of before. Unlike anything else, this one is entirely about the 400+ pages of leaked party document. It is the latter that made me decided to delve into the issue and then to write this long blog.
Central Documents & The Party Machine
The way the system works in China — the way the party leads the country and people — has been changed little over time since the Mao era. The party documents, especially the so-called central documents from Beijing (中央文件), convey what the top leaders think are the best policies for the country, and then everyone, I mean everyone of working ages and belonging to an entity, reads, or more accurately, studies, every document thoroughly. The goal is to figure out or to capture the “spirit” of the document — not so much directly from the words themselves but from between the lines. This becomes necessary because the documents are full of “cookie-cutter” languages and terms that are never wrong anywhere or anytime.
To make matters worse, both the central and local party documents are written with vague terms. I will use made-up examples to illustrate my point. Say in a central document about protecting environment, it may urge the local leaders to keep the carbon dioxide at “the right amount” but never specifies what amount that is. Another document may ask cadres to move “appropriately” to eradicate rural poverty but never says what actions are “appropriate”, and finally a document on maintaining social stability and public safety may demand a crackdown on internet crimes “at the right time” without spelling out when that “right time” is.
I was smiling when I saw the key phrase in the so called Xinjiang Papers: “Rounding up all who should be rounded up” or in Chinese “应收尽收”. So typical of the official vague languages! To an average American, it makes little sense, almost like nothing had been said. Had the same directive were disseminated in the US from the president, federal employees would respond like this: “Excuse me sir, could you be more specific on who should be rounded up? We are, duh, confused!”
But do not worry, the Chinese are used to languages like that. For one thing, Chinese culture is one of the “high context” cultures and people figure out things based on the contexts. Although the vagueness makes every document a puzzle of words for people of rank and file to figure out, for people familiar with the party machine — basically people who have lived in China for their entire lives — the key to win the battle of words is to compare documents over time.
For example, if the assessment of the domestic economic situation from last year’s central document 中央文件 was “heated” but this year it becomes “overheated”, then one gets a clear sense that the top leaders are worried about economy going too fast and some slowdown measures are expected.
Such a system of word puzzles has been in existence ever since the Mao era, and is unlikely to change in the near future. Again for people born and raised in China, it is easy to avoid having multiple interpretations of the same document, or simply reading it wrong. But for outsiders it is a tough challenge that could be disastrous if done wrong. This by the way is one reason most Chinese do not believe their system can be easily duplicated in any other countries. Talking about “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” or 中国特色社会主义, domestic governance through vague termed documents is definitely one of the top “Chinese characteristics” or 中国特色.
Sometimes the leaders in Beijing may feel the need to pass some important messages over directly to the public — or to foreign countries, most likely warnings to enemies that pose immediate threats to China — by publishing editorials or commentaries in the official news outlets with made-up pen names. Since the pen names were never randomly invented or assigned but rather fixed, the Chinese can tell how important a commentary is by simply noticing who wrote it (by its pen name).
Of course there are also meetings of party leaders. The first observation about those meetings is that one only needs to watch the video clip of one meeting, since they are all the same everywhere, at every level: One man, most likely the guy of the highest rank in the room, took the podium on the stage and talked — sometimes off script but more likely read straight from the script. Everyone else would be just busy taking notes — as if they could not use the voice recorder of smartphone to do a better job. There is little discussion or formal Q&A, especially for large gatherings attended by many people. The meeting would be over when the top guy finished his speech and received the round of applause. Sometimes there would be a document passed down based on the speech, but other times no such document at all if the leaders deemed inappropriate for more people to know the content of his speech.
A Shortcut to Reading China
Given how the system works in China, there is actually a shortcut for outsiders to read China: Study very hard the central documents or top leaders’ talks — just like the Chinese would do.
China’s strict top-down flow of policies, ideas and information gives little room for a reversed flow from bottom. For leaders at lower levels, it is only a matter of implementing and following the ideas and policies from the top — and follow them religiously. But this is good news for outsiders: It pays handsomely to just scrutinize the documents or speeches to get the picture of what is, or will be, happening inside the huge and mysterious country.
By the same token, when it comes to the leaked Xinjiang Papers, the most important pieces are not from the local documents, not even so much of what the provincial leaders like Mr. Chen, Quanguo had said, as we know he is just following the guidance of Mr. Xi. The most important documents are without a doubt the internal speeches of Mr. Xi, Jinping to the senior party leaders.
The Excitement Stirred By Secrete Documents
NYT was apparently thrilled by the leaked documents. According to NYT, these documents are “one of the most significant leaks of government papers from inside China’s ruling Communist Party in decades.” They “offer a striking picture of how the hidden machinery of the Chinese state carried out the country’s most far-reaching internment campaign since the Mao era.”
“Even as the government presented its efforts in Xinjiang to the public as benevolent and unexceptional, it discussed and organized a ruthless and extraordinary campaign in these internal communications. Senior party leaders are recorded ordering drastic and urgent action against extremist violence.”
What Mr. Xi Said
Unfortunately the leaked papers did not add much substance to match the excitement. True, “after Uighur militants stabbed more than 150 people at a train station, killing 31. Mr. Xi called for an all-out ‘struggle against terrorism, infiltration and separatism’ using the ‘organs of dictatorship,’ and showing ‘absolutely no mercy.'” His words of “Absolutely no mercy” were used as the headline of the NYT report, but clearly Xi was pointing to terrorism, infiltration and separatism. Had similar attack — more accurately repeated attacks (there were 13 reported) — happened in the US or any other countries for that matter, any responsible sovereign leaders would, and should, order strong and effective counter-strikes.
But China has partly itself to blame. You know what people say, “the best way to kill mold is to expose it under the sun.” Or put differently, transparency kills conspiracy (Warning: based on what we have learned from years under the Trump administration, not all conspiracies will be killed by transparency — especially when someone at the top tries to spur conspiracy.)
Anyway, I remembered back in the Mao era, there were few movies available for the public to watch. One of such movies was Lenin in 1918 made by the formal Soviet Union (all because Mao believed the soviet leaders back then had betrayed Leninism and it was up to him to defend it. This was the only reason movies portraying Lenin were deemed worthy of showing). But toward the beginning of the movie there was a scene of Swan Lake, the masterpiece by Tchaikovsky, when the audience could see the beautiful and “naked” legs of the ballet dancers. The whole scene was on and off for perhaps 5 minutes, but guess what happened? Many Chinese those days would buy tickets to watch the movie again and again — only to catch the scene of those “naked” legs, which they had no chance to see in real life nor in any Chinese movies.
My point is that scarcity of anything, natural or man-made, tends to create a hyper demand for it. Those “naked” legs shared one thing in common with Mr. Xi’s speeches: Scarcity. By keeping the speech secret, Beijing has created something in scarce supply, which alone is enough to make people suspicious of what is in the speeches: There must be something they want to hide! Let’s find it out!
Now let me quote, with highlight added, from the same NYT report: “Mr. Xi also told officials to not discriminate against Uighurs and to respect their right to worship. He warned against overreacting to natural friction between Uighurs and Han Chinese, the nation’s dominant ethnic group, and rejected proposals to try to eliminate Islam entirely in China.”
Mr. Xi even specifically pointed out that: “’In light of separatist and terrorist forces under the banner of Islam, some people have argued that Islam should be restricted or even eradicated,'” he said during the Beijing conference. He called that view “biased, even wrong.”
Frankly, Xi’s words, instead of helping convince me of the charges against him, stroke me as totally within the lines of his duties and responsibilities. They were normal reactions of a national leader. The only thing special is they were given as secrete speeches, but that has been the mode of communication for decades in China. Mr. Xi’s mere reference of learning from the US for counter-terrorism crackdown after September 11 would be enough reason for the party to keep the talks to elite leaders, as Beijing may worry those words could tarnish the public image of the party leadership.
Right after quoting the above words of Mr. Xi, the NYT report claims that “Mr. Xi’s main point was unmistakable: He was leading the party in a sharp turn toward greater repression in Xinjiang.” But, duh, of course as the president of China and the party boss, it was — it must be — Mr. Xi’s call in such an important moment when the entire nation was threatened (there were even attacks in Beijing, the capital of China). It should not surprise anyone and in fact, he would not be doing his job if he acted any other way, especially in a strictly top-down ruled country.
The big question though is whether Mr. Xi had led a crackdown on terrorists or a generally “greater repression in Xinjiang” — more specifically against the minority of Uyghurs. Let’s look back quickly into China’s history before getting the answer.
The Long History of Affirmative Actions in China
It may surprise many but the PRC (People’s Republic of China) has had a long history of affirmative actions since the very beginning of the country in 1949 — longer than the US. I just want to quote this Wikipedia page:
“In the People’s Republic of China, the government had instated affirmative action policies for ethnic minorities called Youhui zhengce (simplified Chinese: 优惠政策)” since 1949. More specifically, “minority ethnic groups in China were not subjected to its well-publicized one-child policy.” and “Three principles are the basis for the policy: equality for national minorities, territorial autonomy, and equality for all languages and cultures.”
The same Wikipedia page reveals more details in the policies: “No taxes in minority regions are required to be sent to the central government; all of it can be spent locally. Minorities receive proportional representation in local government. Higher-level jurisdictions ask lower-level minority areas to put forth “extensive efforts to support the country’s construction by providing more natural resources” and in exchange gives them infrastructural subsidies such as personnel training, budgetary subventions, and disproportionate public works investments. The Chinese government encourages business to hire minorities and offers no-interest loans to businesses operated by minorities. Prominent government posts may be filled with ‘model’ citizens who are also minorities.” Furthermore, “Minority students applying to universities receive bonus points on the National Higher Education Entrance Examination (高考).”
I taught Chinese colleges from 2004 to 2010, so I can personally verify the existence of such bonus points for minority students. I remembered my Han – majority Chinese students were complaining to me about how the minority students did not have to have a college entrance exam scores as high as they did in order to be accepted.
If you know how much the Chinese crave entering college, you would agree that automatically receiving up to 20 bonus points (the exact points differ by provinces and have changed over time, perhaps phasing out completely some day in the future) to your college entrance exam scores — just because your family belongs to one of the 56 minority groups in China — is pretty generous. What make them more precious is that this college entrance exam score is the only thing used to determine whether one would be accepted — and by which — college, as high school GPA counted nothing in China. Numerous high school seniors in China were rejected every year by merely one point below the thresholds.
The other thing to be noticed is that this affirmative action policy has been a common knowledge as Beijing has kept it exceptionally transparent. Like in the US, there were numerous scandals when Han-Chinese (the majority) parents tried to game the system by faking their family identities as belonging to a minority group, so to gain the bonus points for their offspring, much like some rich parents in this country faking sports credits for getting their kids into elite colleges.
Of course, anything coming out of China is likely to meet suspicions eyes. The same Wikipedia quoted some critics as saying “the policies are meant to encourage assimilation instead of empowering minority blocs” and “The idea is to give the minorities just enough power, education or economic success to keep them quiet.” I just want to point out that we could say the same words for the affirmative action in the US.
There were however evidences suggesting we should acknowledge some degree of sincerity in China’s minority policy. The same Wikipedia page told us that Chinese “(s)cholars are creating alphabets for minority languages that had not been previously written as a way of preserving those languages.” For me that is not exactly an assimilation effort but cultural preservation in all honesty.
The Xinjiang Affirmative Action
According to this study (translated from Chinese) by Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences published on September 3, 2020, apparently written to defend criticisms from the west, Beijing has been more lenient toward all minority groups in pushing forward its birth control policy.
Again from the above article: The implementation of the one child policy in Xinjiang, like it has been everywhere else, has followed the order of inland first then the frontier regions, urban first then rural areas, Han-Chinese first then minorities. Starting from 1975, Xinjiang started pushing the one-child policy from Urumqi, the capital of the autonomous region with Han Chinese the majority of population. Not until 1992, the region started the birth control campaign but even then the differential treatment for any minority families was quantifiable. For the Uyghurs, just like for other minorities, two — not one like for the Hans — children were allowed if they lived in an urban area, and three — not two for Hans — if rural. These numbers are always one more child than the Han Chinese. Finally, started in 2017, the region modified the policies, following the revised national law on Population and Family Planning for all ethnic groups: two children per family in the urban areas, but three for families in the rural areas.
A more detailed analysis was provided in this academic article (again in Chinese) by sociologists from the Beijing University, published in 2019. It brought our attention to three factors driving the population changes in Xinjiang: Northern versus Southern Xinjiang, Urban versus Rural, and Han Chinese versus minorities including Uyghurs. I’ve learned that Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is a huge place, occupied a total area of more than 1,600,000+ square meters, accounting for 1/6 of China’s territory. In general, the Southern Xinjiang has had much lower average GDP per capita (26,123 RMB in 2015) than Northern Xinjiang (62,755 RMB in 2015, the South figure was less than half of that for the North). Furthermore, the family planning policy started from 1971 has mostly only affected Han Chinese — as the affirmative action intended to be — who had seen the birth rate down from 38.3‰ in 1972 to 21.16‰ in 1982. For the minorities, herders and rural families, population changed slowly. Thus in 2015, the entire Xinjiang birth rate still maintained at 15‰, only reduced 6‰ over more than 30 years (1982 to 2015). The average birth rate for China the entire country was only 12‰ at the same time.
The important points to keep in mind from the above analysis are that (1) Northern and Southern Xinjiang differ significant in average income and economic development, and most Uyghurs live in the south; (2) Xinjiang has had an efficient and effective affirmative action policy that helped the region maintain a higher birth rate than the nation.
I note one limit of this study: Although it was published in 2019, one can clearly see that its data stopped in 2015, which was years earlier than the re-education camps started. We can clearly see however that right before the re-education period Xinjiang had been faithfully implementing a favorable family planning policy to minorities, herders and rural residents. This has a crucial ramification though: Lagging behind in controlling the birth rate previously among the minorities forced the local government to go harsh on them when in 2017 Xinjiang decided to stop the affirmative action for minorities following the revised law of family planning by the People’s Congress effective on January 1st, 2016, which allowed all families to have two (or three if rural) babies, no longer differentiating by ethnicities. Another important policy change came in 2015, when the revised law of family planning prohibited all forced or coercive means in birth control, and instead encouraged families to voluntarily take steps in controlling their birth rates.
In sum, the NYT report was half right to say that Uyghurs “have long faced discrimination and restrictions on cultural and religious activities.” The claim of a long history of discrimination of the Uyghurs does not go well with the long term affirmative action in Xinjiang. I am also doubtful of systematic restrictions on Uyghur cultural activities. For one thing, among all the minorities in China, the Uyghurs are pretty popular among the Han majority. Uyghurs’ music and dance have long been imitated in all major performances on special occasions. Restrictions on religious activities are most likely correct, although I need more evidences to be convinced that the restrictions had gone above and beyond curbing or purging activities deemed illegal, in association with the religious extremists, secessionists and those in violation of the family planning law.